The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications
by Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout and Gabriel Unger · Quarterly Journal of Economics
Empirical study estimating firm-level markups from US accounting data, documenting a rise from roughly 18 percent above marginal cost in 1980 to 67 percent, and linking concentrated market power to falling labour share and business dynamism.
More resources on Market Structures
MIT 14.271 Industrial Organization I (Fall 2022)
Glenn Ellison's PhD-level industrial organization course with lecture videos, notes, problem sets and annotated reading lists. Pairs imperfect-competition theory with the empirical literature on demand estimation, measuring market power, entry, and merger analysis.
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Graduate reference treating monopoly pricing, price discrimination, quality choice and vertical restraints, then strategic interaction between firms: Cournot and Bertrand competition, capacity constraints, repeated games, product positioning and entry under asymmetric information. Assumes calculus and game theory.
Introduction to Industrial Organization (2nd edition)
Undergraduate industrial organization text covering monopoly pricing, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, collusion, entry deterrence, product differentiation and network effects. Verbal exposition carries the argument, with optional formal sections and exercises for readers who want the algebra.
The Economy 2.0: Microeconomics (CORE Econ)
Open-access textbook whose microeconomics units begin with price-setting firms facing downward-sloping demand, then derive competitive price-taking as a special case. Units 7 and 8 cover markups, demand elasticity, economies of scale, deadweight loss and competition policy.